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in mobile computing systems. 
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During the last decade the decrease in the size of computing machinery, coupled with the 
increase in their computing power has lend to the development of the concept of mobile 
computing. Effects of this new vision is currently evident in the flourishing numbers 
of mobile telephones and portable computing units. In this paper we investigate some 
issues concerning the security of mobile computing systems, within the framework of the 
categories of mobility, disconnection, data access modes and scale of operation (Imielinski 
& Badrinath, 1993). In contrast to previous works which concentrate on security in 
wireless communications, we focus on the security of interactions which are built upon 
the underlying wireless communications medium. Some conclusions are presented on the 
future directions for security research in mobile computing systems. 
1. Introduction 
The birth of "mobile computing" has signalled a new era in the field of computing and 
information systems. The concept of mobile computing is derived from the realization 
that as computing machinery decrease in size and increase in computing power users will 
demand these machinery to be part of their everyday life, accompanying them in the 
carrying-out of their everyday tasks. Researchers in this new field envisage that mobile 
computing units, such as today's laptops and palmtops, in the future will be communi-
cating with each other via wireless networks, whilst providing location transparency to 
the user. This notion of transparency is carried-over from that in distributed computing, 
in which the user is unaware of the remote physical location of the resources being used 
by the distributed computing system. In the case of mobile computing, however, several 
differences emerge. The major difference - and in contrast to distributed computing -
is precisely the mobility or the non-fixed positioning of some of the computing elements. 
This difference in itself presents various new challenges to researchers in the field. 
The growing interest in mobile computing as a real possibility for the future has been 
driven partly by the popularity of mobile telephone systems, which to a certain extent 
has increased the desire on the part of the users to have computing available in a sim-
ilarly mobile manner. The nomadic nature of some mobile computing elements have 
introduced new problems which were non-existent in the traditional areas of computing. 
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Figure 1. The Mobile Computing Network and its Com-
ponents (after [1]) 
New solutions and solutions derived from traditional computing are in demand in order 
to transform the dreams of mobile computing into a reality. 
In the notable work of [2], four categories for future developments in mobile wireless 
computing have been proposed, namely mobility, disconnection, data access modes and 
scale of operation. These areas present challenges to the traditional approach to dis-
tributed computing, which until recently have not included effects of mobility into their 
design and applications. In this paper we would like to propose security as being the fifth 
category which intersects the first four categories. Similar to the early research efforts 
during the last two decades in the area of traditional computing systems, currently much 
emphasis have been placed on deriving solutions which provide for acceptable performance 
and availability, with little stress on the need of security in such solutions. 
Unlike previous works which concentrate on communications security in wireless net-
works [3, 4] such as the European GSM or U.S Digital Cellular (USDC), here we wish to 
focus more on the security of interactions which are built upon the underlying wireless 
communications medium. Each of the four categories of [2] introduces differing levels and 
ranges of security requirements, and in this paper we will briefly discuss some security 
issues within the framework of these categories. 
For simplicity and generality, we will use the terms Mobile Unit (MU) for the users and 
their portable computing unit, Mobile Support Station (MSS) for the stations which main-
tain communications with the mobile units and Fixed Host for the other nodes connected 
to the mobile support stations [1]. The basic network architecture is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. Location servers in the Mobile Network (af-
ter [1]) 
In addition, Location Servers (LS) are employed to keep track of the position and ac-
tions of each mobile unit. Hence, a given location server holds a database containing 
information about a mobile unit registered as having a "home-base" in the area or zone 
managed by the location server and about visitors in the area (cell). These location sever 
databases are used to manage and operate the mobile wireless network [5], and as such, 
they are not directly accessible to the mobile units. The data stored in these database are 
used and inter-exchanged only among location servers, and between location servers and 
mobile support stations (Figure 2). The location servers typically correspond to mobile 
switching offices, with approximately 60 to 100 mobile support stations being catered for 
by one location server [6] 
In the next section we discuss the security issues pertaining to the mobility factor 
in mobile computing. This is followed in Section 3 with a discussion on the effects of 
disconnections on security. This followed by security issues relating to the new access 
modes within mobile computing in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 closes the paper with 
some remarks and conclusions. 
2. Mobility and Security 
The fact that both users and the data that they carry have become a mobile compo-
nent in computing has in itself introduced a set of security problems different to that in 
traditional computing. In the traditional case of fixed (non-mobile) computing physical 
protection could easily be afforded by making a computer and database system physically 
isolated from the other components in the environment. In such a configuration it was 
possible to make the system self-sufficient, without any need to communicate with the 
external world. More recent firewall techniques may also be applied to achieve the same 
effect. 
In mobile computing this form of isolation and self-sufficiency is difficult to achieve 
due the relatively limited resources available to a mobile unit, thereby necessitating it to 
communicate with the mobile support station. The mobility of users and the data that 
they carry introduces security problems from the point of view of the existence and location 
of a user (which is deemed to be data in themselves) and the secrecy and authenticity of 
the data exchanged between users and between a user and a fixed host. More specifically, 
a user on a mobile wireless network may choose to have the information concerning his 
or her existence treated as being confidential. That is, a user may choose to remain 
anonymous to the majority of other users on the network, with the exception of a select 
number with whom the user often interacts. 
This problem of user anonymity in mobile computing is related to a more difficult 
problem of the trust level afforded by each node in the wireless network and the problem 
of the security of location data concerning a user when the location data is stored or 
transferred between nodes as the user moves in a nomadic fashion. These nodes must 
provide some assurance to the user about his or her anonymity, independent of the differing 
levels of trust that may exist for each node. This requirement is of particular importance 
in the case of a user that crosses between two zones which are under two nodes respectively, 
each having a different trust level. Equally important is the secure transfer of data between 
databases at nodes which hold location data and other information or parameters in the 
user profile. Here all traffic internal to the network and transparent to the nomadic user 
must be maintained secure and authentic. 
Another potential security problem lies in the possibility of information leakage through 
the inference made by an attacker masquerading as a mobile support station with or 
without the aid of a subverted mobile support station. The attacker which masquerades 
as a mobile support station may issue a number of queries to the database at the user's 
home node or to database at other nodes, with the aim of deducing parts of the user 
profile containing the patterns and history of the user's movements. Here again, security 
techniques are required both for the databases and for the identification of users and 
mobile support stations. Any scheme to be used must ensure that any queries submitted 
to a given database at a user's home-base is accompanied by sufficient proof that the user 
approves of the queries submitted by the (foreign) mobile support station controlling the 
zone under which the user is currently roaming or passing through. It is, therefore, not 
unreasonable to assume that some method of delegation of rights [7] will be employed 
between the user and the mobile support stations (and fixed hosts) in the network. 
Related to the management of these databases and the provision of performance trans-
parency [6] for the nomadic user is the issue of replication of certain parameters and user 
profiles with the aim of replicating the environments surrounding the user. Thus, as the 
user roams across zones, the user must not experience a degradation in the access and 
latency times. Again, security must be considered in the context of replication, both from 
the trust level of the mobile support stations and fixed hosts and from the point of view 
of data leakage. In general, as sensitive data is replicated across several sites, the security 
risks are also increased due to the multiplication of the points of attack [8]. 
3. Security in Disconnections 
Another major issue in mobile computing which arises from mobility and power (bat-
tery) restrictions is disconnections. The disconnection of a mobile unit from a mobile 
support station is necessary for the conservation of power of the mobile unit. A mobile 
unit can typically find itself running on a temporary form of power supply (eg. spare 
battery) while its main power source is being recovered (ie. recharged). In this situation 
differing levels of disconnection may be introduced, ranging from the normal connection 
to connections using low bandwidth channels. 
A crucial aspect of disconnection is the elective or non-elective nature of a disconnec-
tion [2]. The non-elective disconnection refers to the cases when a mobile unit disconnects 
due to an unforeseen event, such as system crashes or total communications break-down 
when moving into certain geographic regions. The elective disconnection refers to the 
planned and desired disconnection on the part of the owner of the mobile unit who wishes 
to temporarily limit remote access to his or her mobile unit. This type of disconnection 
typically covers instances where power availability is degrading, where the owner wishes 
to employ the maximum resources (eg. CPU) available for a short task, or where the 
owner simply desires the mobile unit to be put into a "sleep" state. 
In both types of disconnections, a number of potential security loop-holes may be 
introduced. The transition from one level of disconnection to another may present an 
opportunity for an attacker to masquerade either the mobile unit or the mobile support 
station. Any disconnection transition scheme must ensure that an attacker cannot mimic 
the mobile unit and then present the mobile support station with a false cancellation 
command with regard to the disconnection. That is, an attacker should not be able 
to "hi-jack" the communications of a mobile unit which is stepping-down its level of 
connection and then masquerading as the mobile unit. Similarly, an attacker must not 
masquerade as a mobile support station to a mobile unit that is about to step-up its level 
of connection. 
One possible solution to this problem is for the mobile unit and the mobile support 
station to agree upon a secret before any transition in the levels of elective disconnections. 
When at a later time the mobile unit wishes to upgrade the connection level with the 
mobile support station, both parties can start by exchanging the shared secret in a secure 
manner. A good candidate for a solution to this problem is zero-knowledge protocols, in 
which the mobile unit and the mobile support station can convince each other that they 
hold the shared secret without having to transmit the full secret [9]. Other schemes based 
on smart cards may also be a good candidate (eg. [10]). 
Another potential security problem related to disconnections is the leaking of infor-
mation through the use of inappropriate concurrency control techniques in the database 
of the mobile unit. During the past few years research work in the area of secure con-
currency control techniques have indicated that covert channels exist in many standard 
concurrency control algorithms [11, 12]. A covert channel is created in multilevel database 
systems when one user can indirectly control the abort/commit patterns exhibited by the 
transaction scheduler. These patterns are then experienced by other transactions belong-
ing to a second user. In this manner, the first user can leak data to the second user who 
may not actually have access to the data readable by the first user. If a database in a 
mobile unit is to be accessible by a remote user in the form of the remote user submitting 
small transactions, then the potential for covert channels will exist unless the mobile unit 
employs a suitable and secure concurrency control algorithm. 
Related to this issue is the problem of incomplete transactions caused by elective and 
non-elective disconnections. A number of scenarios present themselves in this context. 
Security and integrity problems may occur in the case when hand-offs occur between two 
mobile support stations as the mobile unit crosses zones (cells). Other security problem 
may occur when a mobile unit deposits a "timed" transaction at a fixed-node, which 
begins to execute when certain conditions are met (eg. time of day, availability of raw 
data) and which transmits the results back to the nomadic mobile unit. These scenarios 
represent only a few potential security problems among many others in the context of 
levels of disconnections and transaction management in mobile computing. 
4. Secure Data Access Methods 
One of the advantages of mobile communications derives from the possible use of broad-
casting techniques to provide services to varying sizes of audience groups (users) with 
minimal change in the delivery cost of the services. The work of [13] identifies two meth-
ods of delivering information to the mobile unit of users by a broadcast server, namely 
through data broadcasting and interactive requests. The possibility of continuous broad-
casting of ever-changing data lends to the attractive notion of data broadcasting being a 
public form of "memory", where mobile units periodically refresh their limited memories 
( caches) using "data on the air". 
Two important parameters related to the broadcasting of data are access time and 
tuning time, the first referring to the time taken for a reply to be received by a client 
(mobile unit) from the broadcast server, the later referring to the amount of time taken 
by the client in "listening" to the channel in order to obtain the selected data. Here, the 
mobile unit will first listen to an "index channel" that delivers a directory related to the 
broadcasted data, then it will proceed to use the directory information as a guide as to 
when the mobile unit should access the stream of data. Ideally, the mobile unit should 
remain in "doze" mode until the required data is being broadcasted, at which time it 
should automatically wake itself up from this mode. Such a scenario is within reach of 
today's technology (with the minor exception of the battery technology that must still be 
improved). However, there are a number of issues related to the security and integrity of 
the broadcasted data that need to be addressed and solved. 
The first and foremost is the authentication of the source of the broadcast (eg. broadcast 
server) by the mobile units. Since such a broadcast may carry public data whose accuracy 
is paramount (eg. stock exchange data) and whose authority for publication (eg. NYSE) 
is accepted by the community, source authentication and integrity becomes crucial as 
minor inaccuracies - accidental or deliberate - may result in great losses on the part of 
the users. Therefore, methods are needed for initial source authentication by the mobile 
units, and for the periodic source re-authentication by the mobile units in such a way 
that it consumes less power than the initial authentication. Such methods would be 
attractive if they use (cryptographic) parameters which are embedded within the stream 
of broadcast data and which are recognizable at a given time only by the mobile units 
that require to perform re-authentication at that time. This will also lend to the ability 
of targeting re-authentication procedures for different groups of users (mobile units) at 
different moments in time. 
Together with source authentication comes the need to maintaining integrity of the 
broadcast data stream. Here, a number of possible attack scenarios present themselves, 
one being the denial of service attack ranging from crude channel interference to the 
sophisticated modifications of the index channel resulting in the mobile unit listening 
to incorrect (useless or undesirable) parts of the broadcast stream. More sophisticated 
attacks may even attempt to substitute segments from both the index channel and the 
data stream in such a way that the mobile unit is unaware of the attack. 
The notion of a continuous broadcast of data being a public "memory" together with the 
limited physical memory (cache) available at the mobile unit leads to the important issue 
of trust accorded by the users to the source of broadcast. Since the "public memory" 
will become a fleeting entity of a short lifetime, accountability of the source and the 
auditability of the broadcast data becomes necessary to prevent the source becoming a 
"Big Brother" who has control over the short memory of the public. 
5. Remarks and Conclusion 
There is still a long way for research to proceed before mobile computing will become 
a daily reality in society. Although considerable effort is being focused towards research 
in mobile computing, much of it is concentrating on the performance and availability of 
mobile computing, with comparatively little attention being given to the security issues 
in such an environment. 
In this paper we have proposed security to be a major category for future developments 
in mobile computing. We have discussed briefly the issues of security in the context 
of mobility, disconnection and data access methods, presenting a number of potential 
problems in the security of a mobile computing environment. 
The mobile computing environment and its' security presents a new ground for fur-
ther research, with some problems which are non-existent in the traditional non-mobile 
computing environment. Future work on the security of mobile computing must address 
the problems pertaining to the security of information within the three sub-areas of the 
mobile environment: 
• The security of information residing in the mobile units, and the correctness and 
integrity of data in these mobile units. 
• The security of information as it travels "over the air" between mobile units and 
mobile support stations. An important consideration in this area is the power 
consumption of the algorithms and schemes that implement this secure data transfer. 
New secure data storage schemes and data organization techniques will be required 
to facilitate rapid searching and transfer of data to and from mobile units. 
. ' 
• The security of information within the mobile wireless network. This includes the 
security of databases holding control data used for the operations and management 
of the mobile wireless network. 
These three sub-areas of research will be crJlcial if mobile computing is to be a reality in 
the future. 
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